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ABSTRACT: This article advances three arguments about Euroscepticism. First, using 
Israel as a case study we describe its alliances with Eurosceptic political actors, claiming 
that while each side hopes to benefit from these alliances to advance particular interests, 
the attraction among the actors are based on ideological affinities that do not align with 
the norms informing EU policies. If these norms become more contested, it may make it 
more difficult to construct a ‘normative power’ based approach in EU foreign policy. 
Second, we reveal how third parties can use Euroscepticism as an instrument for shaping 
EU foreign policy. Finally, we expose how this strategy produces a political paradox. By 
allowing itself to become an instrument deployed by a third party, the Eurosceptic 
member state also agrees to be pushed back into the fold of the EU apparatus, thus 
reconstituting itself as an internal actor, one which has stakes in the process and is 
willing to play by the rules of the game. 
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In January 2016, the European Union’s (EU) Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) reinforced 
its ‘differentiation policy’ in the ‘conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process’ (MEPP). 
It highlighted the EU’s position that products from Israeli settlements in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories must be labeled clearly in all the 28 member states (MS), and 
expressed the EU’s commitment to ensure that ‘all agreements between […] Israel and 
the EU must unequivocally and explicitly indicate their inapplicability to the territories 
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occupied by Israel in 1967.’1 While several MS hailed the FAC’s conclusions, in the days 
leading up to the vote, the foreign policy document constantly was changed, and its 
criticism of Israel’s colonial project was softened.  
The drama behind the scenes cannot be found in the FAC’s official records, but its 
traces appear in internal draft proposals leaked to the authors.2 These drafts underscore 
the increasing importance of a relatively new tool deployed to shape EU foreign policy: 
Namely, the use of Euroscepticism by third parties as an instrument for modifying EU 
foreign policy. While the leaked internal draft proposals reveal how the FAC Conclusions 
were changed, interviews carried out with senior European and Israeli officials suggest 
that Israel in effect was the ‘29th delegation’ in the EU’s negotiation room in Brussels, 
‘reading EU draft texts and amendments in real time.’3 More importantly, these senior 
officials propose that Israel successfully exploited Greece’s dissatisfaction with European 
austerity policies to advance its own political goals.  
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1 Council of the EU (2016) Press Release: Council Conclusions on the MEPP, January 
18, Clause 8, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/01/18/fac-conclusions-mepp, accessed July 17, 2018. 
2 Five internal draft proposals were leaked to the authors in February 2016.  
3 Andrew Rettman (2016) Israel Got Real-Time Leaks from EU Security Talks, 
euobserver, February 8, available at:  https://euobserver.com/investigations/132166, 
accessed July 17, 2018. 
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      Using Israel as a case study, in this article we advance three arguments about 
Euroscepticism. First, we describe the alliances Israel is creating with Eurosceptic actors, 
claiming that while each side hopes to benefit from these alliances to advance particular 
interests, the attraction among the different actors are based on ideological affinities that 
do not sit well with some of the dominant norms informing EU policies. In some 
instances, these alliances aim to weaken ‘Normative Power Europe’s’ core norms,4 while 
on other occasions they may strive to undermine norms informed by the neoliberal 
consensus.5 Insofar as these norms are contested within the EU, it makes it more difficult 
to construct a ‘normative power’ based approach in both EU internal and foreign policy. 
      Second, we reveal how third parties can use Euroscepticism as an instrument for 
shaping foreign policy, showing how Israel exploited the Eurosceptic proclivities of a MS 
to alter the FAC conclusions. Finally, we expose how this strategy produces a political 
paradox. By allowing itself to become an instrument deployed by a third party, the 
Eurosceptic MS also agrees to be pushed back into the fold of the EU apparatus, thus 
reconstituting itself as an internal actor which has stakes in the process and is willing to 
play by the rules of the game. In a sense, the instrumentalization of Euroscepticism by 
third parties ultimately may soften the Eurosceptic stance.  
                                                          
4 See article by Ian Manners in this special issue; see also Ian Manners (2002) Normative 
Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 
pp. 235–258. 
5 Wendy Brown (2015) Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution 






In their seminal research on the sources of Euroscepticism, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary 
Marks explain that the term ‘expresses doubt or disbelief in Europe and European 
integration in general.’6 Accordingly, we refer to Euroscepticism as the distrust and 
opposition to the process of European integration,7 including negative attitudes toward the 
EU’s declared principles, norms, values, policies, bodies and institutions.  
Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism ‘implies outright rejection of the entire project of 
European political and economic integration, and opposition to one’s country joining or 
remaining a member of the EU.’ In practice, ‘hard Euroscepticism’ ‘is expressed by a 
principled objection to the current form of integration in the EU on the grounds that it 
offends deeply held values or, more likely, is the embodiment of negative values.’8 By 
                                                          
6 Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks (2007) Sources of Euroscepticism, Acta Politica, 42(2–
3), p. 120.  
7 Paul Taggart (1998) A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary 
Western European Party Systems, European Journal of Political Research, 33(3), pp. 
363–388; Hajo G. Boomgaarden & André Freire (2015) Religion and Euroscepticism: 
Direct, Indirect or No Effects? West European Politics, 32(6), pp. 1240–1265.  
8 Paul Taggart & Aleks Szczerbiak (2004) Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Systems 
of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe, European 
Journal of Political Research, 43(1), p. 3; see also Petr Kopecký & Cas Mudde (2002) 
5 
 
contrast, soft Euroscepticism ‘involves contingent or qualified opposition to European 
integration. It may take the form of ‘policy’ Euroscepticism or ‘national-interest’ 
Euroscepticism, although these often overlap.’9 In both cases, Euroscepticism is driven by 
ideological and strategic motivations.  
Building on insights informing the existing literature, in the following pages we 
add another crucial layer to the study of Euroscepticism. While we focus on Israel, Russia 
also has exploited the Euroscepticism of radical right parties in Europe to advance its 
interests over the past few years,10 but this and other similar cases have not been 
conceptualized as the exploitation of Euroscepticism as an instrument of foreign policy 
deployed by third parties. Israel’s exploitation of Euroscepticism in order to sway EU 
foreign policy in a way that is conducive to its own objectives is, we maintain, a relatively 
new phenomenon and involves a paradoxical twist since the Eurosceptic MS that 
intercedes at the behest of a third party actually intervenes in the process through which a 
cohesive EU foreign policy is shaped and in this way reasserts its position within the 
European framework.  
 
Israel’s Relations with Eurosceptic Actors  
                                                          
The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East 
Central Europe, European Union Politics, 3(3), p. 300.  
9 Taggart, et al., ‘Contemporary Euroscepticism’, p. 40. 
10 See for example, Antonis Klapsis (2015) An Unholy Alliance: The European Far Right 
and Putin’s Russia (Brussels: WMCES).  
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EU-Israeli relations have received considerable scholarly attention in recent years.11 
While there is no Israeli grand strategy towards the EU, Israel has exploited differences 
among MS in order to try to influence the Union’s foreign policy in a way that accords 
with its own interests. Already in 1980, for example, just before the European 
Community (EC) launched its own peace initiative with the Venice Declaration, Israel 
tried to take advantage of disagreements among the Community’s members in order to 
influence the precise formulation of how Europe envisions the resolution of the Middle 
East conflict.12 Similarly, in 2004, immediately after the International Court of Justice 
                                                          
11 See for example, Sharon Pardo (2013)  The Year that Israel Considered Joining the 
European Economic Community, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(5), pp. 901–
915; Neve Gordon & Sharon Pardo (2015) Normative Power Europe and the Power of 
the Local, Journal of Common Market Studies 53(2), pp. 416–427; Patrick Müller & 
Peter Slominski (2017) The Role of Law in EU Foreign Policy-Making: Legal Integrity, 
Legal Spillover, and the EU Policy of Differentiation Towards Israel, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 55(4), pp. 871–888; Krassimir Y. Nikolov (2017) Partnership after Peace? 
An Optimistic view on the EU’s Future Special Privileged Relations with the States of 
Israel and Palestine, Diplomacy 19, pp. 228–267; Anders Persson (2017) Shaping 
Discourse and Setting Examples: Normative Power Europe can Work in the Israeli–
Palestinian Conflict, Journal of Common Market Studies 55(6), pp. 1415–1431; Anders 
Persson (2018) ‘EU Differentiation’ as a Case of ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) in the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Journal of European Integration, 40(2), pp. 193–208; Guy 
Harpaz (2018) The Front Polisario Verdict and the Gap Between the EU’s Trade 
Treatment of Western Sahara and Its Treatment of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
Journal of World Trade, 52(4), pp. 619–642. 
12 Patrick Müller (2012) EU Foreign Policymaking and the Middle East Conflict. The 
Europeanization of National Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge). 
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(ICJ) issued its advisory opinion that the Israeli separation barrier was a violation of 
international humanitarian and human rights law,13 and just before the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) voted on the matter, Israel lobbied intensively trying to play 
MS one against the other in an effort to prevent the adoption of a resolution supporting 
the ruling.14  
Israel’s exploitation of Euroscepticism to advance its political interests is, 
however, a relatively new phenomenon. In recent years, Israel has established cordial 
relations with leaders and senior officials of Eurosceptic populist right-wing parties and 
governments.15 In 2015, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) adopted ‘Guidelines on 
                                                          
13 International Court of Justice (2004) Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, No. 131, pp. 136–
203. 
14 Sharon Pardo & Joel Peters (2010) Uneasy Neighbors: Israel and the European Union 
(Lanham: Lexington Books), pp. 7, 19.  
15 Noa Landau (2018) Splitting the EU: Israel’s Tightening Alliance with Central 
Europe’s Nationalist Leaders, Haaretz, July 8, available at 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-splitting-the-eu-israel-s-tightening-
alliance-with-central-europe-1.6247069, accessed July 17, 2018; Yehuda Ben-Hur Levy 
(2015) The Undiplomats: Right-Wing Populists and Their Foreign Policy, available at: 
http://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2015/pb_ybl_undiplo_
21aug15-11804.pdf, accessed July 17, 2018; see also, Cas Mudde (2007) Populist 
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Communication with Radical Right Parties in Europe.’ While the document remains 
classified, sources familiar with the document told us that the Guidelines stipulate three 
major conditions and considerations: i) the Israeli government is not allowed to 
communicate with anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi radical right parties, whose leaders and/or 
members call for the destruction of Israel and of the European Jewish communities; ii) the 
Israeli government will not launch a dialogue with a radical right party if the local Jewish 
community is against such a dialogue; iii) the Israeli government will consider the 
positions of ‘like minded countries’ toward the relevant radical right party.16 Nonetheless, 
Israeli politicians regularly meet with Eurosceptic leaders who express pro-Israeli 
sentiments, but have anti-Semitic tendencies. For instance, Israeli officials maintain 
strong relations with the Dutch right-wing populist Party for Freedom led by Geert 
Wilders, with the Hungarian Fidesz right-wing populist party led by Viktor Orbán,17 and 
                                                          
Radical Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Cas Mudde (2017) 
On Extremism and Democracy in Europe (Oxon: Routledge).  
16 Authors Interview with a senior Israeli official, Tel Aviv, March 30, 2017. 
17 Paul Lendvai (2017) Orbán: Europe’s New Strongman (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), pp. 230, 243, 249; Anshel Pfeffer (2018) Orbán is Coming to Israel to Meet His 
Soulmate Netanyahu. Here’s How He’s Taking Down Hungary’s Democracy, Haaretz, 
July 17, available at https://www.haaretz.com/world-
news/europe/.premium.MAGAZINE-how-orban-is-taking-down-hungary-s-democracy-
1.6280256, accessed July 17, 2018.   
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with the Italian Lega Nord party.18 Cas Mudde is of the opinion that populist radical right 
parties across Europe ‘increasingly look at Israel as a model, i.e., an “ethnocracy” which 
they want to (re-)instate in their own country.’ Moreover, Mudde claims that these parties 
see in Israel’s major right-wing governing party – the Likud – ‘an ideological ally, in 
terms of ethnic nationalism in the overarching struggle against “Global Islam.”’19 
Israel also nurtures relations with Eurosceptic governments. In fact, one of Israel’s 
former top diplomats admitted to us that, ‘for many years, and especially since the 2004 
enlargement, Israel organized workshops, or as we called them “dialogues,” with these 
countries on how the EU works and on how to block decisions within the EU apparatus.’ 
According to the former diplomat, who personally participated in such workshops, and 
even organized some of them:  
[W]hile Israel knows well that these Eurosceptic [MS] are not the most 
influential EU actors, still Jerusalem hopes that their growing influence will 
exert some pressure on other EU members and the Union institutions, 
especially with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.20   
The attraction, it appears, is mutual, whereby Israel seeks out relations with these 
Eurosceptic forces due to certain ideological convergences that defy aspects of the EU’s 
traditional self-identity and norms.21 In April 2016, for example, following an invitation 
                                                          
18 Landau, ‘Splitting the EU’.  
19 E-mail correspondence between the authors and Cas Mudde, March 19, 2017. 
20 Authors Interview with a former top Israeli diplomat, Tel Aviv, February 13, 2017.   
21 Authors Interview with a senior Israeli official, Jerusalem, 25 January 2016.   
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by the Likud party, Heinz-Christian Strache, the leader of the Austrian FPÖ party, visited 
Israel. During his visit, he showed support for Israeli products from the Occupied 
Territories (OT). A leading Likud member said that the MFA policy of boycotting FPÖ 
party officials ‘was wrong, because Strache is a friend of Israel.’ Strache ‘wants to learn 
about Israel and encourage Europeans to buy Israeli products. How long can we give a 
cold shoulder to people who want to show us love?’22 The following year, Strache vowed 
to do all in his power, ‘be it legislative or eventually executive, to move the [Austrian] 
Embassy […] to Jerusalem.’23  
Israel understands that once the dominant EU norms become more contested, it 
will become more difficult to construct a ‘normative power’-based approach toward 
Israel, mitigating some of the external European pressure to end its colonial project. 
Hence, Israeli relations with right-wing populist parties are based, on the one hand, on 
short term opportunistic calculations, whereby the European populist parties may use the 
relation with Israel to dispel, for example, their anti-Semitic / ‘brown’ image, while Israel 
                                                          
22 Herb Keinon & Reuters (2016) Peres Refuses to Meet with Leader of Far-Right 
Austrian Freedom Party, The Jerusalem Post, April 12, available at 
http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Peres-refuses-to-meet-with-
leader-of-far-right-Austrian-Freedom-Party-450996, accessed July 17, 2018. 
23 Raphael Ahern (2017) In Austria, Rise of Pro-Israel, Far-Right Faction Forces Israel 
into Corner, The Times of Israel, October 11, available at: 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-austria-rise-of-pro-israel-far-right-faction-forces-israel-
into-corner, accessed July 17, 2018.        
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uses the Eurosceptic actor to advance specific interests either in their country’s parliament 
or in EU institutions. On the other hand, the convergence among these actors may be 
based on deeper ideological affinities aimed at altering some of the core liberal norms 
associated with EU policies. Here we only can gesture toward such uses of 
Euroscepticism, while it is obvious that more research needs to be carried out to analyze 
properly the effects of such alliances. 
It is vital, however, to stress that Israel’s exploitation of Euroscepticism differs 
from its efforts to take advantage of the diverse national interests of MS in order to 
advance particular political or economic objectives. In the past, for example, Israel used 
the different economic interests of the MS in its campaign against the Union’s ‘REACH 
regulation,’ which protects human health and the environment from the risks that can be 
posed by chemicals.24 While the exploitation of diverse interests among MS involves 
Israel’s exploitation of conflicted positions on the matter at hand, the use of 
Euroscepticism as a third-party instrument exploits a MS’s contingent, qualified or 
outright opposition to the process of European integration25 to advance an EU foreign 
policy that is unrelated to the grievances motivating the Eurosceptic stance.  
                                                          
24 Ora Coren (2006) Haichud Hairopi Neged Teve: Al Yisrael Lishkol Mediniyuta 
Beinyan Trufot Generiot [The European Union against Teva: Israel must consider its 
policy regarding generic drugs], The Marker, November 28, available at:  
https://www.themarker.com/markets/1.388335, accessed July 17, 2018.  
25 Taggart,  ‘A Touchstone’, p. 366.  
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Israel’s use of a MS’s Euroscepticism to modify EU foreign policy is accordingly 
similar to its exploitation of guilt for the Holocaust or Islamophobia, in the sense that in 
such cases a specific political position is exploited to advance an unrelated topic. For 
example, in the 2007-2009 ‘upgrade process’ of the EU-Israeli relationship, Israel took 
advantage of the German Presidency of the EU, using German Holocaust guilt to 
convince it to push the Union to reaffirm its determination to upgrade bilateral relations 
and to issue guidelines for strengthening the political dialogue structures with Israel (the 
so-called December 2008 ‘upgrade process’).26 Nonetheless, there is also a difference 
between these two strategies: the emphasis of Euroscepticism wittingly or not serves as a 
push back against certain norms that inform EU policy, while the invocation of Holocaust 
guilt, in and of itself, does not necessarily weaken such norms.  
 
Syriza’s Euroscepticism  
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the economic breakdown in Greece, Europe’s 
migration crisis and the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom (UK), Eurosceptic 
attitudes within Europe have been on the rise. One of the parties that used its Eurosceptic 
message to garner widespread support was Syriza. From its first days in government, 
Syriza and its leaders have been committed to find a way out from what they perceive to 
be ‘the humiliation’ of the Greek people ‘at the hands of the masters of the Eurozone and 
the EU.’27 Prime Minister (PM) Alexis Tsipras himself supported the general perception 
                                                          
26 Pardo, et al., Uneasy Neighbors, pp. 65–68.   
27 Kevin Ovenden (2015) Syriza: Inside the Labyrinth (London: Pluto Press), p. xvi.  
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that during the negotiations over the austerity measures, ‘we have lost our sovereignty’28 
to Brussels, the Troika and Germany, while Foreign Minister (FM) Nikos Kotzias ‘casts 
the EU as a potential enemy who wants to cheat us and look down on us.’29 According to 
Kotzias, Greece has become a ‘debt colony’ within the EU.30 ‘We will not raise our hands 
like students asking for permission,’ the FM said,31 adding that the powerful EU 
countries, and especially Germany, are characterized by economic cultural nationalism 
                                                          
28 Paul Mason (2015) The Inside Story of Syriza’s Struggle to Save Greece, The Nation, 
December 18, p. 21, available at https://www.thenation.com/article/the-inside-story-of-
syrizas-struggle-to-save-greece, accessed July 17, 2018.  
29 Xenia Kounalaki (2015) Kotzias, Dugin and the EU, ekathimerini.com, January 29, 
available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/166715/article/ekathimerini/comment/kotzias-
dugin-and-the-eu, accessed July 17, 2018.   
30 Nikos Kotzias (2013) Greece: Debt Colony (Athens: Patakis Publishers). 
31 Aristotle Tziampiris (2017) Foreign Policy Against Austerity: Syriza’s Multifaceted 
Experiment, in: Spyridon N. Litsas, Aristotle Tziampiris (eds) Foreign Policy Under 




and racism.32 It was against this background that the Syriza government took a ‘U-turn’ in 
its position toward Israel.33  
   
Israeli-Greek rapprochement  
While Greece recognized Israel already in 1949, the relationship between the two 
countries was ambivalent, aloof, distant and uneasy, mainly because of traditional Greek 
anti-Americanism, the Greek dependence upon Arab oil, the Greek desire for Arab 
support in the United Nations (UN) on the Cyprus issue, and a political alliance between 
Greece and the Palestinians. According to Aristotle Tziampiris, it took 41 years (1990) 
before Greece finally raised its diplomatic relations with Jerusalem to ambassadorial 
level, although Israeli-Greek relations remained cool for an additional 19 years, and only 
in 2009 following an unprecedented flurry of diplomatic activities between Jerusalem and 
Athens did relations begin to improve substantially.34  
During the 2012 and the 2015 elections campaigns, Syriza and its leadership were 
highly critical of the emergence of Israeli-Greek cooperation, and the party was well 
                                                          
32 Kotzias, Greece, summary.  
33 Asa Winstanley (2015) Syriza’s U-Turn on Israel is Now Complete, Middle East 
Monitor, November 28, available at: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20151128-
syrizas-u-turn-on-israel-is-now-complete/amp/, accessed July 17, 2018.  




known for its pro-Palestinian positions.35 In 2011, for example, Tsipras was among the 
Greek activists who were scheduled to board a Gaza-bound flotilla aimed at breaking the 
Israeli siege of Gaza. Syriza’s party platform called for the complete ‘abolition of military 
cooperation with Israel,’ and Greek ‘support for [the] creation of a Palestinian state within 
the 1967 borders.’36 After assuming office, however, Syriza’s hostility toward Jerusalem 
began to change. By January 2016, Greece, under the leadership of PM Tzipras, held a 
trilateral summit in Nicosia with Israel and Cyprus, and officially agreed on ‘closer 
cooperation and a coordinated set of policies’ in the fields of ‘energy, tourism, research 
and technology, environment, water management, combating terrorism and migration.’37 
Each of the three allies has its own reasons for this regional ‘quasi-alliance,’ yet energy 
interests, animosity toward Turkey and the Eastern Orthodox Church’s financial interests 
and properties in Israel are the three primary motivations that all the partners have in 
common.38 Tziampiris concludes that from a Greek perspective ‘the emergence of Israeli-
                                                          
35 Ibid.  
36 Syriza (2012) Greece: SYRIZA’s 40-Point Program, May 27, Clause 38, available at 
http://links.org.au/node/2888, accessed July 17, 2018.    
37 Israel MFA (2016) Trilateral Meeting Between Israel, Greece and Cyprus, January 28, 
available at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2016/Pages/Trilateral-meeting-between-
Israel-Greece-and-Cyprus-28-Jan-2016.aspx, accessed July 17, 2018.  
38 Zenonas Tziarras (2016) Israel-Cyprus-Greece: A ‘Comfortable’ Quasi-Alliance, 
Mediterranean Politics 21(3), p. 407; Nir Hasson (2017) Greek Orthodox Church Quietly 
Selling Off Israeli Assets at Fire Sale Prices, Haaretz, October 14, available at 
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Greek cooperation constitutes the most significant development and new direction in 
Greek foreign policy.’39 Similarly, an Israeli top diplomat believes that ‘the Israeli-Greek 
alliance is probably one of the most important foreign policy strategic assets that Israel 
successfully developed in the past years. It is also significant for Israeli-EU relations.’40 
The rapprochement between the two countries served as the condition of 
possibility for Israel’s exploitation of Greek Euroscepticism to advance its own political 
objectives. Exploiting Greek anger toward the EU austerity policies, the Israeli MFA 
learned in mid-December 2015 that the FAC was about to adopt in its January 2016 
meeting conclusions that would draw, yet again, a clear distinction between Israel-proper 
and the territories it occupied in 1967, thus legitimizing the implementation of sanctions 
on exports of Israeli products from the OT. Fearing that such a conclusion could bolster 
the much broader and more threatening Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) 
campaign against Israel,41 the Israeli government decided to try to modify the 
conclusions’ wording, softening the critique against its colonial project and its violation 
of international law.  
                                                          
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.816980, accessed July 17, 2018; Authors 
Interview with a senior Israeli diplomat, Beer Sheva, November 21, 2017.  
39 Tziampiris, The Emergence, p 1. 
40 Authors Interview with a senior Israeli diplomat, Tel Aviv, February 13, 2017. 
41 Barak Ravid (2016) New EU Draft Resolution Draws Stark Distinction Between Israel, 
Settlements, Haaretz, January 17, available at https://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/.premium-1.697683, accessed July 17, 2018. 
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In early January 2016, the Israeli MFA began contacting those MS, which it 
thought would be willing to exert pressure on the EU to reword certain clauses in the 
FAC conclusions in such a way that they would lose their potency. Through the so-called 
‘Regional Group for Crisis Response,’42 the ‘Visegrad Four’(V4)43 the EU Baltic MS, 
Germany, and the UK, Jerusalem collected first-hand information regarding the precise 
wording of the draft proposal. According to senior Israeli officials, ultimately Greece 
played a vital role in convincing the other EU MS to soften the Conclusion’s language.44 
The first draft text of the FAC conclusions, which was circulated among EU MS 
on 11 or 12 January 2016, included clauses whose wording Israel found extremely 
troublesome. Israel approached Greece, a candidate that just several years earlier would 
have been unwilling to cooperate, exploiting, on the one hand, the newly devised energy 
and security alliance among Israel, Greece and Cyprus as well as Israel’s and Greece’s 
fraught relations with Turkey,45 and, on the other hand, Greece’s Euroscepticism 
                                                          
42 The MS of this regional group are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and Romania. The group 
aims at boosting the partnership between its members in cases of common security and 
migratory challenges.  
43 These are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. 
44 Authors Interview with a senior Israeli diplomat, Brussels, June 7, 2017. 
45 Following the discovery of offshore natural gas by Israel and Cyprus, Greece discussed 
with the two countries the idea of becoming alternative European energy providers, with 
Greece being the transit state for their gas. In March 2014, however, it was found that the 
‘financial and topographic realities render such a pipeline financially and topographically 
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informed by its aversion toward EU austerity policies. According to Israeli and Greek 
officials who we interviewed, it was Greece’s opposition toward EU austerity programs 
and animosity toward Germany even more than the fledgling strategic partnership 
between Greece and Israel that motivated Greece to lobby for the modification of FAC’s 
conclusions.46 Some interviewees suggested that Greece used the occasion as a form of 
symbolic reprisal, channeling its animosity toward the EU and Germany for compelling it 
to make drastic cuts in public spending.47 As one Israeli official put it: ‘We do our utmost 
to make sure that the Eurosceptic countries – and in the past year mainly Greece – fight 
on any possible issue with other EU members, so that the Union heads for a crash-
landing.’48 Another former Israeli senior diplomat admitted that ‘the issue is not to find 
Eurosceptic [MS]. We always have the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and others. The 
                                                          
infeasible’; see further Allison Good (2014) A False Hope: Eastern Mediterranean Gas 
Through Greece and Cyprus, The National Interest, June 2, available at 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/false-hope-eastern-mediterranean-gas-through-greece-
cyprus-10577, accessed July 17, 2018. 
46 Authors Interview with senior Israeli and Greek diplomats, Brussels, June 7, 2017; 
Beer Sheva, November 21, 2017.  
47 Ibid. 




challenge is to convince a Eurosceptic EU member to operate with the same passion of 
Greece and block the Union’s voting machinery.’49 
Within a span of a single week, the FAC’s proposed document went through five 
drafts, and each draft was sent by the Greek officials in both Athens and Brussels to the 
MFA in Brussels and Jerusalem, where Israeli officials introduced changes to the 
wording, sending the document back to the Greeks, who then proposed these changes to 
the relevant EU officials, as well as to the members of the FAC. The objective was to 
frame Israel’s colonial project as a symmetric conflict between two parties, which 
ultimately would soften the critique of international law violations, while also deflecting 
the Palestinian call for BDS. In what follows, we examine differences between the first 
draft and final document, to underscore some of the changes. 
 
The January 2016 FAC Conclusions     
One kind of change involves limiting Israel’s liability by downplaying the extent of 
violations it has carried out in the Palestinian territories. The changes introduced in the 
last sentence of the first clause exemplify this type of modification. The first draft ends 
with the following sentence: ‘The EU recalls the special significance of the holy sites and 
calls for upholding the status quo in line with previous understandings and with respect to 
                                                          
49 Authors Interview with a former senior Israeli diplomat, Beer Sheva, November 21, 
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Jordan’s special role.’50 The final document adds an important qualification. It reads as 
follows: ‘The EU recalls the special significance of the holy sites, and calls for upholding 
the status quo put in place in 1967 for the Temple Mount / al-Haram al-Sharif in line with 
previous understandings and with respect to Jordan’s special role.’51 Hence, in the final 
document the EU emphasizes the significance of maintaining the status quo only in 
Temple Mount / al-Haram al-Sharif and not in other holy sites or in Jerusalem and the 
West Bank more generally. This is crucial considering that Israel continuously is 
changing the ‘status quo put in place in 1967’ and by so doing is violating, inter alia, the 
Fourth Geneva Convention.52  
Another type of change strives to frame the relations between the colonizer and 
the colonized as having a symmetrical component. An example of this kind of reframing 
can be found in Clause Ten of the final document:  
The EU calls for all parties to take swift steps to produce a fundamental change 
to the political, security and economic situation in the Gaza Strip, including the 
end of the closure and a full opening of the crossing points, while addressing 
Israel’s legitimate security concerns. Recent rocket fire by militant groups is 
unacceptable and underlines again the danger of escalation. All stakeholders 
must commit to non-violence and peace. […] The EU calls all parties, state and 
                                                          
50 Secretariat Mashreq/Maghreb (2016) Draft Council Conclusions – Middle East Peace 
Process – FAC 18 January 2016, Doc. 1/16 – Rev 1, 12 (?) January, Clause 1. 
51 Council of the EU, ‘Press Release’, Clause 1.  
52 Neve Gordon (2008) Israel’s Occupation (California: University of California Press).  
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non-state actors to guarantee unimpeded humanitarian access to Gaza, as 
foreseen by international humanitarian law, for national, local and international 
humanitarian organizations, including EU bodies and [MS].53 
Note that the clause is directed to ‘all parties’ as if they all bear the same 
responsibility for dismantling the colonial project. The clause then compares Israel’s 
harsh military siege on Gaza and the economic crisis experienced by the Palestinians with 
Israel’s ‘legitimate security concerns.’ The corresponding clause in the first draft also 
introduced a certain degree of symmetry, but it did not mention Israel’s legitimate 
security concerns, the rocket fire by Palestinian militant groups, nor did it make 
symmetrical demands from ‘all stakeholders.’54 
The symmetric valance of Clause Ten might be connected to the reformulation of 
Clause Seven in the final document, where the EU underscores in unequivocal terms the 
illegality of Israel’s settlement project and in this sense is clearer than the original draft. 
The effort to produce an imagined symmetry between Israel and Palestine may have been 
motivated by a desire to create an illusory balance among the different clauses. What is 
important from our perspective is that neither symmetry nor balance adequately reflect 
the power differential between the two sides in the conflict, and that Greece intervened in 
order to introduce an illusionary symmetry at Israel’s behest. 
                                                          
53 Council of the EU, ‘Press Release’, Clause 10. 
54 Secretariat Mashreq/Maghreb, ‘Draft’, Clause 7.   
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The most important change, however, involves Clause Six in the first draft and the 
corresponding Clause Eight in the final version, since this is the clause that has the 
potential to become operational. Clause Six in the first draft provided that:  
The EU is united in its commitment to ensure consistent, full and effective 
implementation of existing [EU] legislation and bilateral arrangements 
applicable to settlement products. The EU will continue to unequivocally and 
explicitly make the distinction between Israel and those territories occupied by 
Israel in 1967, namely the Golan Heights, the West Bank including East 
Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Since it does not consider them to be part of 
Israel’s territory, the [EU] and its [MS] reiterate their commitment to ensure 
that all agreements of the EU and its [MS] with the State of Israel, in form and 
implementation, are not applicable to these territories. The Council reaffirms 
that this consistent position is fully in line with international law and should 
not in any way be equated to boycott, which the EU opposes.55  
While the officials at the European External Action Service (EEAS) fully supported 
the wording of Clause Six of the first draft text,56 Israel perceived it to be extremely 
‘hostile’ and ‘unilateral.’57 Through the Greek delegates, Israel tried to secure major 
changes to the text and a stronger condemnation of any sort of a boycott against Israel. 
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And, indeed in line with some of the Israeli wishes, and against the will of the EEAS 
officials, the wording of Clause Six was softened already in the second draft text and in 
the ones that followed.   
Using the ‘simplified written procedure,’ the fifth draft text was approved by all the 
28 MS ambassadors to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on Friday 15 January 
2016. Greece, however, had a change of heart. Within minutes after its Permanent 
Representative to the EU, agreed to the adoption of the fifth draft text using the silence 
procedure, he suddenly announced that Athens objects to the text’s wording. According to 
one observer, ‘the anger in the meeting room was palpable.’58 
After Greece expressed its dissatisfaction, it was agreed to form an informal 
working group to work on a sixth draft text, and which would be presented to the 
ministers and discussed by them during the FAC meeting the following Monday. Before 
the weekend, Greece was almost alone in its opposition to the fifth draft text, but on 
Monday morning it already enjoyed the full backing of the three other member countries 
of the ‘Regional Group for Crisis Response’ and of all the V4 countries. The final version 
of Clause Eight reads as follows: 
The EU and its Member States are committed to ensure continued, full and 
effective implementation of existing EU legislation and bilateral 
arrangements applicable to settlements products. The EU expresses its 
commitment to ensure that - in line with international law – all agreements 
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between the State of Israel and the EU must unequivocally and explicitly 
indicate their inapplicability to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. 
This does not constitute a boycott of Israel, which the EU strongly opposes.59 
In addition to emphasizing the strong opposition to a boycott (which already was 
introduced in previous drafts), the final formulation introduces an important change by 
erasing the following words: ‘The EU will continue [sic] to unequivocally and explicitly 
make the distinction between Israel and those territories occupied by Israel in 1967, by 
ensuring inter alia the non-applicability of all EU agreements with the State of Israel, in 
the form of implementation, to these territories.’60 By underscoring the distinction 
between Israel and the OT, this deleted sentence provides the reason why the agreements 
between Israel and the EU are inapplicable to the OT, and maintains that the distinction 
will be sustained by ensuring the non-applicability of agreements in the future. In this 
way, it produces a circular logic: a distinction exists between the two territories and 
therefore the agreements signed with Israel are not applicable to the OT, and because the 
agreements are not applicable to the OT, a distinction exists between them. By erasing the 
reasoning behind the inapplicability of the agreements – namely, the legal distinction 
between the territories – the final document modifies the reference of international law. If 
in the previous drafts the EU’s commitment to international law referred to both the legal 
distinction between the territories and the agreements it had signed with Israel, now it 
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refers only to the applicability of the agreements. While this might appear to be a legal 
quibble, for Israel it was important and therefore Greece insisted on modifying the 
document. 
According to one senior Israeli official, ‘[T]his was a triumph on so many fronts. At 
the national level, at the regional level and at the European level. We got the exact 
wording that we wanted.’61 For the EU, this proactive Eurosceptic foreign policy 
instrument employed by Israel against the EU posed a new challenge, a challenge that 
Brussels still does not fully understand and recognize. In the words of one EEAS official: 
‘Months after the FAC meeting of January 2016, Brussels is still shocked and ashamed, 
licking its wounds, and trying to understand what exactly happened during that cold 
January.’62 
 
Conclusion: The Paradox of Eurosceptic Intervention 
Israel and several other actors are using the Eurosceptic stance of certain EU MS as an 
opportunity to advance its own political goals. We pointed to three different yet 
interrelated processes. The first one, which still needs considerable empirical evidence to 
be analyzed properly, examines the alliances between right-wing Eurosceptic political 
actors, claiming that while each side hopes to benefit from these alliances in different 
ways, the attraction among the actors are based on ideological affinities aimed at altering 
the core liberal norms informing EU identity. If these core liberal norms become more 
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contested, it may make it more difficult to construct a ‘normative power’-based approach 
in EU foreign policy, hence alleviating external pressures, in our case the ones directed 
against Israel.  
The second process has to do with the use of Euroscepticism as an instrument for 
shaping foreign policy. In this case, Israel exploited the hardship of Greek austerity and 
its ensuing Eurosceptic stance, alongside a possible, even if economically unfeasible, 
energy deal, the deteriorating Turkish-Israeli relations and the Eastern Greek Orthodox 
Church’s financial interests and properties in Israel in order to gain Greek support. 
Euroscepticism was, according to our informants, an important part of this equation and, 
accordingly, was transformed into an instrument that Israel wielded to achieve specific 
political objectives. Finally, we suggested that, by allowing itself to become a third party 
instrument, the Eurosceptic MS – in this case Greece – also agreed to be pushed back into 
the fold of the EU apparatus, thus reconstituting itself as an internal actor which has 
stakes in the process and is willing to play by the rules of the game.  
In January 2015, it was FM Nikos Kotzias who warned that ‘anyone who believes 
that because of the debt Greece will give up its sovereignty and its active participation in 
European politics is mistaken.’63 Putting words into action, a year later, Athens 
proactively intervened in the conclusions formulated by FAC, even though it did not 
really have a direct stake in the document’s precise wording. By encouraging this 
Eurosceptic MS to engage in the process Israel hoped to advance its own interests, but 
simultaneously this engagement helped produce unified European Conclusions on the 
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MEPP,’ which in effect softened the outsider perspective characterizing the Eurosceptic 
stance. That is, by taking on an active role in this saga, by insisting to influence the 
process, Greece actually moved a step back into the EU’s fold.  
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